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1. Introduction
The Fault Tree (FT) [1] is a widespread model for the
dependability analysis of complex systems and allows to
model how combinations of component failures can deter-
mine the failure of subsystems or of the whole system; an
example is reported in Fig. 1; the nodes can be failure events
or gates: failure events are represented as a bar and are
equivalent to a boolean variable whose value is 0 until the
failure event has not yet occured, or 1 when the event has
occured; gates are connected to events by means of arcs and
have several input events and a unique output event, con-
nected respectively below and above the gate. The events
that are represented as a bar with a circle, are called basic
events (BE) and correspond to the failure events of physi-
cal components of the system; the occurence time of such
events is ruled by a probability distribution associated to
each BE, typically an exponential distribution whose pa-
rameter
 
is called failure rate. The internal events, repre-
sented as an empty bar, correspond to subsystems failures;
an internal event is the output of a gate and occurs when a
particular combination (determined by the type of the gate)
of the gate input events occurs. While BEs can not be the
output of any gate, there is a unique event called Top Event
(TE), indicated by a black bar, that can only be the output of
a gate; TE represents the failure of the whole system. A FT
may contain several kinds of gates; in the standard version
of this model, BEs are considered as statistically indipen-
dent and three gates corresponding to the AND, OR, K of N
boolean functions are defined; such a model can be easily
analyzed in a combinatorial way [1], but it suffers from the
inability to represent dependencies among failure events; in
order to overcome this limitation, some new gates called dy-
namic gates were introduced and they are:
 Priority AND (PAND) - it fails if all of its input events
fail and in a specified order (from left to right);
 Functional Dependency Gate (FDEP) - it forces a set
of dependent events to occur when a particular event
called Trigger occurs;
 Sequence Enforcing Gate (SEQ) - it forces a set of
events to occur in a specified order (from left to right);
 Warm Spare Gate (WSP) - it models the presence of a
set of spare components able to replace one or more
main components when one of them fails; the spares
change their failure rate when turning from the dor-
mant state (stand-by) to the working state.
The resulting model is called Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT)
[2]. The introduction of dynamic gates changes the way
to perform the system dependability analysis: while stan-
dard FTs are solved in a combinatorial way, DFTs require
the state space analysis. Another evolution of the model
concerns the way to represent the system redundancies
and symmetries compactly; this purpose is achieved by the
Parametric Fault Tree (PFT) [3]; using PFT, identical sub-
systems are represented by a unique parameterized sub-
tree whose root is a (Basic) Replicator Event (RE), indi-
cated by a dotted bar; a parameter is associated to the RE
and its variation range (for instance, from 1 to 3) indicates
how many identical subtrees are represented in a compact
way; such parameter will be associated even to the events
inside the replicated subtree; a replicated subtree may fur-
therly contain other REs using combinations of several pa-
rameters. DFT and PFT formalisms can be integrated gen-
erating the Parametric Dynamic Fault Tree (PDFT) [4] sup-
porting both parameterization and dependencies in the fail-
ure mode. As DFT, PDFT needs the state space solution.
2. The solution technique
Fig. 1 is an example of DPFT: this system is composed
by three subsystems called  , 
	 ,  , and it
fails when two of them are failed (  is the output of a K
of N gate with 	 and  );  (output of an OR
gate) fails if at least one among ff , fi	 and 
(represented as ffifl "! with  varying from  to  ) fails;
ffifl "! fails when all of its components ( #fl "! and $fl &%(')!
with ' varying from  to 	 ) fail ( ffifl "! is the output of an
AND gate). 

	 is the output of a PAND gate, so it fails
if both C and D F are failed and * failed before + , ; + ,
fails if at least one +-fl./! is failed;  fails if  or 0 ,
fails; 0 , (output of a WSP gate) fails when the main com-
ponent 0 is failed and there are no spares 12fl435! available
to replace it.
As mentioned in section 1, PDFT requires the state space
solution because it can contain dependencies in the failure
mode due to dynamic gates; state space solution may be
computationally very expensive, so in our approach we try
to apply such technique only to those subtrees that speci-
fically require it. So, the first step of the adopted solution
process is called modularization and consists of detecting
modules, i. e. indipendent subtrees; a subtree is a module
if both it does not share any node with other subtrees and
it does not descend from a dynamic gate; modules are de-
tected applying a previously realized linear time algorithm
[5] that has been adapted to consider the presence of depen-
dencies due to dynamic gates [6] or shared parameterized
nodes [4]. Once modules are detected, they are classified as
dynamic or static if they contain or not at least one dynamic
gate (classication step). Dynamic modules are then classi-
fied as minimal if they do not contain other modules of any
kind.
Only dynamic modules need a state space solution; a
way to perform such analysis consists of translating them
in a High Level Stochastic Petri Net in the form of Stocha-
stic Well-formed Net (SWN) [7]; this is done by means of a
specific translator (Fig. 3, Fig. 4). Suppose we have to per-
form a transient analysis of the PDFT, in other words we
have to calculate the probability that the system is failed at
a given mission time: we detach each minimal dynamic mo-
dule (MDM) and we translate it in a SWN. Instead of the
ordinary state space, a symbolic state space, whose dimen-
sions are smaller, can be generated from a SWN and ana-
lized; in this way, we solve in isolation every MDM, calcu-
lating its probability of failure at the given mission time (de-
composition step). The combined use of parameterization,
modularization, decomposition and translation of MDMs in
SWN can lead to a relevant reduction of the state space di-
mensions [4].
The translation of a MDM in SWN is performed in this
way: for each BE and for each gate inside the MDM, a SWN
is created separately; considering the MDM in Fig. 1 whose
root is 

	 , we create a distinct SWN for the BEs * (Fig.
2.a) and +-fl46! (Fig. 2.b), and for the gates PAND (Fig. 2.c)
and OR (Fig. 2.d); then, such SWNs are composed together
performing a superposition over the common places corre-
sponding to MDM events; in this case, * , +7fl4/! and + , .
The resulting net is shown in Fig. 3; SWN compositionality
is very flexible allowing the generation of the correspon-
ding SWN even for complicated combinations of gates.
Now we replace in the PDFT each detached MDM with
a BE which has not a failure rate but a probability of failure
that is equal to the probability calculated on the correspon-
ding module (substitution step); at this point we obtain a
PFT that is no more dynamic because it does not contain
any dynamic gate; we call it Reduced PFT (Fig. 5) and it
can be solved in a combinatorial way after having been un-
folded, i. e. converted in the equivalent FT.
The whole process has been implemented following a
multi-solution multi-formalism approach [8] adapting the
graphical tool called DrawNET++ [9] to the PDFT forma-
lism, using the GreatSPN tool [10] as SWN solver and the
SHARPE package [11] to solve the reduced PFT, once un-
folded.
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Figure 1. An example of DPFT
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Figure 5. The reduced PFT
3. Future works
Future developing on PDFT will regard mainly these as-
pects:
 the integration of the PDFT formalism with the Re-
pairable Fault Tree (RFT) [12] formalism; this issue
has alreay been partially studied in [4], but only regar-
ding the WSP gate; failure and repair semantics must
be defined in order to integrate dynamic gates and Re-
pair Boxes (RB) [4][12]; for instance, if one of the in-
put events of a PAND gate is repairable, such event is
repeatable: which is the failure order causing the fail-
ure of the PAND gate?
 Currently only the quantitative analysis is available for
PDFT, so a way to perform a qualitative analysis of
PDFT must be studied in order to detect minimal cut
sets (MCS) or sequences, i. e. the minimal sets or se-
quences of BEs leading to the failure of the whole sys-
tem; this issue was already partially faced in the case
of PFT [3] and DFT [13].
 The solution of the reduced PFT requires an unfolding
step; we would like to be able to perform a combi-
natorial analysis of a PFT directly, without unfolding
it; this might be done through a previous qualitative
analysys step.
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